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DOUBLE-CELLING AT PONTIAC: ARE INMATES BEING
SUBJECTED TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT ARISING OUT OF
OVERCROWDED CONDITIONS?
Smith v. Fairman
690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982)
DEBRA BORENSTEIN*
The eighth amendment,' which is applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, 2 imposes limitations upon the conditions in
which a state may confine those convicted of crimes. Punishments can-
not be "cruel and unusual."' 3 The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted this limitation to mean that prison conditions "must not in-
volve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting
imprisonment." '4
The eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment has been defined as a fluid concept which draws its meaning from
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 5 Accordingly, in the late 1960's to early 1970's prison inmates
obtained a series of unprecedented federal rulings that confinement
under conditions as they existed in the Arkansas penal system violated
their constitutional rights.6 After the Arkansas prison cases there were
general attacks on the conditions in state prisons throughout the coun-
try, particularly in the South.7 This litigation produced widespread ju-
* B.A. Economics 1980, Queens College--City of New York. J.D. 1983 liT/Chicago-Kent
College of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
2. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
3. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981).
4. Id. at 347.
5. Id. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
6. The Arkansas prison cases are: Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 915 (1969); Holt v. Sarver (Holt II), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), af'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971); Holt v. Sarver (Holt I), 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Jackson v. Bishop,
268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967), vacated and remanded, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Talley v.
Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965). For an extensive review of the Arkansas cases, see
Note, Prison Reform in the Federal Courts, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 99 (1978) [Hereinafter cited as
Prison Reform].
7. Prison Reform, supra note 6, at 109. See, e.g., ALABAMA: McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d
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dicial recognition of the right of every prisoner to be confined in decent
and humane surroundings. 8 Individual prisons or entire prison systems
in at least twenty-four states have been declared unconstitutional under
the eighth and fourteenth amendments, 9 with litigation pending in
many others.' 0
Much of this litigation concerned the issue of overcrowding which
1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975); James v. Wallace, 386 F. Supp. 815 (M.D. Ala.
1974), aft'd, 533 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1976); James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1974),
consolidated sub. nom., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, and remanded sub. nom., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); Newman v.
Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aft'd inpart, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975). FLORIDA: Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla.
1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded,
430 U.S. 325 (1977). LOUISIANA: Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). MIS-
SISSIPPI: Gate v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.
1974), enforced, 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975), motionfor accelerated relief denied, 407 F.
Supp, 1117 (N.D. Miss. 1975), enforced, 423 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aj7'd, 548 F.2d 1241
(5th Cir. 1977). OKLAHOMA: Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974), subse-
quent unpublished order aff'd, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977). TEXAS: In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976). VIRGINIA: Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Va. 1971), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va.), 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973);
Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966).
8. Prison Reform, supra note 6, at 111. For example, courts have required that adequate fire
protection, Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977), heat, Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459
F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1972), sanitation, Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970), on remand,
331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971), and light, Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Pa. 1976)
be provided. See Prison Reform, supra note 6, at 111-12.
9. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353-54 and n.l (1981) (Brennan, concurring). ALA-
BAMA---See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd as modfled, Newman v.
State of Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)
(per curiam); ARIZONA-See Harris v. Cardwell, No. Civ. 75-185-PHX-CAM (D.C. Ariz. Oct.
14, 1980) (consent decree); ARKANSAS--See Finney v. Mabry, 458 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Ark.
1978) (consent decree); COLORADO--See Ramon v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); DELAWARE---See Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D.
Del. 1977); FLORIDA--See Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), af'd, 525
F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), vacated on reh'g on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
rev'd, 430 U.S. 325, aff'don remand, 553 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam); GEOR-
GIA--See Guthrie v. Caldwell, No. 3068 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 1978) (consent decree); ILLINOIS-
See Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Ill. 1980); IOWA-See Watson v. Ray, 90 F.R.D.
143 (S.D. Iowa 1981); KENTUCKY---See Kendrick v. Bland, No. 76-0079-P (W.D. Ky. Oct. 24,
1980) (consent decree); LOUISIANA-See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977);
MARYLAND-See Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md.), a17'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378(4th Cir. 1978); Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727 (D. Md. 1978), aff'dinpart, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th
Cir. 1978); MISSISSIPPI-See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); MISSOURI--See
Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979); NEW HAMPSHIRE--See, Laaman v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977); NEW MEXICO-See Duran v. Apodaco, No. 77-721-C (D.
N.M. 1980) (consent decree); NEW YORK--See Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977);
OHIO-See Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. Ohio 1079); OKLAHOMA-See Battle
v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977); OREGON--See Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802
(D. Or. 1980); PENNSYLVANIA---See Hendrick v. Jackson, 10 Pa. Comm. 392, 309 A.2d 187
(1973); RHODE ISLAND--See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D. R.I. 1977), re-
manded, 599 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1979); TENNESSEE-See Trig v. Blanton, No. A-6047 (Chancery
Ct. Nashville, 1978), vacated (Ct. App. 1980) (for consideration of changes in conditions), app.
pending (Tenn. S. Ct.); TEXAS-See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
10. There are over 8,000 pending cases filed by prisoners challenging prison conditions,
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is considered responsible for many of the major problems in correc-
tional institutions." For example, in a typical case,' 2 a federal district
court described the Alabama penal system as "horrendously over-
crowded"' 13 to the point where many inmates were forced to sleep on
mattresses spread on floors in hallways and next to urinals.14 A United
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 n.2 (1981) (Brennan, concurring) (citing NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 34 (1980)).
State prisoners alleging violations of their constitutional rights concerning conditions of con-
finement and/or treatment during confinement may be heard in federal court by filing an action
under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter referred to as
§ 1983], or by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Most of the litigation
attacking prison conditions has arisen under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, be-
cause filing under § 1983 carries distinct advantages. For example, exhaustion of state judicial
and administrative remedies is not required before filing a § 1983 complaint, Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), the doctrine of abstension is usually
inapplicable, Wright v. McMarn, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967), pro se complaints are liberally
construed by the courts and judged by less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
attorneys, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), it is easy to obtain class action certification
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th
Cir. 1975) (The general rules regarding the burden of proof in establishing a class must not be
rigidly applied), and § 1983 offers a wide range of possible remedies for violations of prisoners'
rights. A BRONSTEIN & P. HIRSCHKOP, PRISONER RIGHTS 1979, at 77 (Vol. One).
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). Jurisdiction to hear § 1983 cases is vested in the federal courts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4).
State prisoners may also have their complaints attacking conditions of confinement enter-
tained in the federal courts by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). See
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 the federal courts can consider a
prisoners' application if he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States. However, under § 2254(b), a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted, "unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." Exhaustion must include
both available state judicial and state administrative remedies. Preser v. Rodriguiez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973). Further, if a claim involves the challenge to a conviction or affects the duration of confine-
ment of a state prisoner, the sole means of obtaining relief is through the federal habeas corpus.
Id. For a discussion on federal prisoners' access to federal courts, see A. BRONSTEIN & P.
HIRSCHKOP, PRISONERS' RIGHTS 1979, 85-91 (Vol. One).
11. Note, 7he Increasing Scope of Federal Judicial Involvement in State and Local Corrections
Facilities, 3 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON LAW 227, 238 (1976) (hereinafter cited as PRISON LAW).
12. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), ardsub. non., Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part and remanded sub. nom., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781
(1978) (per curiam), cert. denied sub. nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
13. Id. at 332. In addition to being overcrowded, the physical facilities were dilapidated and
infested with vermin. Sanitary facilities were limited and in ill repair. In one instance, over two
hundred men were forced to share one toilet. Inmates were not provided with toothpaste, tooth-
brushes, shampoo, combs, or other such necessities. Food was unappetizing and unwholesome.
There were no meaningful rehabilitation programs, and violence was rampant. Id. at 323-26.
14. Id. at 323.
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States health officer described the Alabama prisons as "wholly unfit for
human habitation according to virtually every criterion used for evalu-
ation by public health inspectors." 15
Overcrowding is due to the unprecedented upsurge in the number
of inmates in federal and state correctional facilities. 16 The increase in
prison population is so severe that one court' 7 recently stated that a
Texas prison could not hope to eliminate double and triple-celling,
even with a new forty-three million dollar unit. 18
Under these circumstances, courts have emerged as a critical force
behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane prison conditions. ' 9 Judicial in-
tervention has been responsible for remedying some of the worst
abuses due to overcrowding. 20 Overcrowding and cramped living con-
ditions, however, remain pressing problems in many prisons. In most
cases, courts easily apply eighth amendment prohibitions upon a find-
ing of overwhelmingly offensive prison conditions. 2' Where prison con-
ditions are not overwhelmingly offensive, however, courts have a more
difficult task in examining overall conditions and determining whether
the aggregate effect of prison conditions on inmates is violative of the
Constitution. Therefore, courts place great emphasis on the presence of
objective criteria22 when they determine the constitutionality of prison
conditions.
15. Id. at 323-24. Evidence also revealed that weaker inmates were repeatedly victimized by
the stronger inmates. Robbery, rape, extortion, theft, and assault were everyday occurrences
among the general inmate population. Id.
16. The number of inmates in federal and state correctional facilities has risen 42% since
1975, and in 1980 grew at its fastest rate in three years. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 357
(1981) (Brennan, concurring) (citing Krajick, The Boom Resumes, 7 CORRECTIONS 16, 16-17
(1981)) (report of annual infusion of prison population). One report attributes the burgeoning
prison population to the increase in tough new laws. See New Laws Are Raising Population at
Fastest Rate in 56 Years, Statistics Show, The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 8, 1982, at 12, col. 1.
17. Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), afrdinpart and rev'd in part, 679 F.2d
1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438 (1983).
18. 503 F. Supp. at 1280-81.
19. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring), The Commis-
sioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections testified before a congressional committee that
lawsuits brought on behalf of prison inmates "have upgraded correctional institutions and the
development of procedural safeguards regarding basic constitutional rights. There is no question
in my mind that had such court intervention not taken place, these fundamental improvements
would not have occurred." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 360-61 (1981) (Brennan, J. concur-
ring) (citing Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons, Hearings on S. 1393 before the Subcommit-
tee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 409-10
(1977) (testimony of Kenneth F. Schoen).
20. Seesupra cases cited note 9. See also Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968)
("Humane considerations and constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured or
limited by dollar consideration...").
21. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 567 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981) (living conditions of the prison were "unfit for human habitation").
22. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
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Recently, in Smith v. Fairman ,23 an inmate challenged confine-
ment conditions at the State of Illinois' Pontiac Correctional Center
(Pontiac), alleging that the institutional practice of housing two prison-
ers in a single cell violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.24 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that an examination of the totality of con-
ditions at Pontiac revealed that overcrowding had not produced uncon-
stitutional living conditions therein. 25 The court based its holding on
uncontroverted statistics which showed that institutional violence at
Pontiac had declined in the last few years, even with the upsurge in
prison population. 26 Thus, the facts failed to support many experts'
projections as to the deleterious effects of overcrowding on inmates. 27
The court concluded that although prisoners spent extended periods of
time in small, crowded, two-man cells, conditions at Pontiac were
merely restrictive and harsh; they did not rise to the level of cruel and
unusual punishment. 28
This case comment will focus on the court's opinion in Smith. It
will review and analyze the Seventh Circuit's ruling that the totality of
conditions at Pontiac did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. This analysis will demonstrate that the court properly con-
strued the issues of law before it and correctly emphasized the effects of
double-celling on Pontiac inmates. This case comment will also
demonstrate, however, that the court may have misconstrued the fac-
tual issues involved by giving too much weight to the data produced by
prison officials and not enough weight to the abstract studies produced
by expert witnesses who visited with prisoners at Pontiac. In its quest
to find credence in the prison officials' data, the court often stretched to
find explanations that would deny the findings of the plaintiffs' expert
witnesses. In this process, the court relied on facts that were contradic-
tory. The result was that some conditions at Pontiac, such as the venti-
lation system and the presence of vermin, remain in dispute. Because it
was not clear what some of the conditions at Pontiac were like, it is
difficult to say with certainty that overall prison conditions at Pontiac
did not violate the Constitution. Finally, this comment will consider
23. 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982).
24. Id. at 123.
25. Id. at 125.
26. Id. at 124.
27. Id. at 125.
28. Id. at 125-26.
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the significance of the Smith decision and the impact it will have on
future eighth amendment litigation.
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASES
A. The Eighth Amendment
Traditionally, judicial intervention in prison administration was
subject to the hands-off doctrine. 29 Under this doctrine, courts were
without power to supervise prison administration or interfere with ordi-
nary prison regulations.30 Only in exceptional circumstances such as
beatings, tortures, and other physical abuse would courts interfere.3'
Further, the judicial attitude towards prisoners was indifferent and
harsh.32
In the middle to late 1960's, however, courts began to extend con-
stitutional rights to prisoners.33 Federal courts began to hold that al-
though the lawful incarceration of prisoners brings about the limitation
of many privileges and rights, prisoners retain "all the rights of an ordi-
nary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken
from him by law."' 34 Recognition of prisoners' rights imposed an obli-
gation on federal courts to enforce these rights and adherence to the
hands-off doctrine declined. 35
29. Note, Eighth Amendment Challenges to Conditions of Confinement: State Prison Reform by
Federal Judicial Decree, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 288, 291 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Eighth Amend-
ment Challenges]. The phrase "hands-off" originated in FRITCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF FEDERAL
PRISON INMATES 31 (1961) (Federal Bureau of Prisons Document). Eighth Amendment Challenges
at 291 n.26.
30. Banning v..Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). For a list
of cases explaining the limitations of the hands-off doctrine, see Eighth Amendment Challenges,
supra note 29, at 291 n.27.
The hands-off doctrine was based on several rationales, including separation of powers, fed-
eralism which bars federal intervention on behalf of state prisoners, lack of judicial expertise in
peneology, and a fear that intervention would subvert internal prison discipline. Haas, Judicial
Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of the "Hands-Oft" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV.
795, 797 [hereinafter cited as Haas].
31. For an extensive discussion of the hands-off doctrine, see Haas, supra note 30, at 796.
32. For example, one court stated that the convicted felon "has, as a consequence of his
crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its
humanity accords him. He isfor the time being a slave ofthe state." Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62
Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 792 (1871) (emphasis added).
33. Federal courts began to review prison conditions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969) (the Right of Court access); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Barnett v. Rodgens,
410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (the right of inmates to practice religion); Jackson v. Goodwin, 400
F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (racially discriminatory practices in prisons).
34. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944). Accord, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972); LeVier v. Woodson, 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 576
(8th Cir. 1968); Jackson v. Goodwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1968); Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d
992 (9th Cir. 1966).
35. Eighth Amendment Challenges, supra note 29, at 292. For excellent discussion on the
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Judicial intervention, however, remained restrictive and inade-
quate because courts did not examine the totality of prison living con-
ditions.36 Rather, tests determining whether particular actions
constituted cruel and unusual punishment were applied only to isolated
prison practices that endangered the life or health of individual prison
complainants. 37 Accordingly, poor prison conditions (not individually
violative of the eighth amendment) affecting the entire prison were in-
sufficient to constitute eighth amendment violations.38
However, in Holt v. Sarver,39 a federal court adopted the "totality
of conditions" approach to testing the constitutionality of confinement.
Holt stated that courts considering an eighth amendment challenge to
conditions of confinement must examine the totality of the circum-
stances. Even if no single condition of confinement is unconstitutional
in itself, inmates may be subject to cruel and unusual punishment
based on the net effect on the prison environment. 40 Today, the totality
of conditions test has been adopted by virtually all federal courts.4'
extension of constitutional rights to prisoners in the 1960's see, Robbins & Buser, Punitive Condi-
tions of Prison Confinement: Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Adminis-
tration under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REv. 893, 894 (1977); Note, Decency and
Fairness. An Emerging Judicial Rolefor Courts in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841 (1971).
36. Eighth Amendment Challenges, supra note 29, at 292. Courts utilized this restrictive
method because they viewed the eighth amendment provision as enacted only to prevent inhu-
man, barbarous or torturous punishment. Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1960); Hermans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 801 (1947); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), afi'd, 390 U.S. 335
(1968) (per curiam).
37. See, e.g., United States v. ex. rel. Knight v. Regan, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); Queen v. South
Carolina Dep't. of Corrections, 307 F. Supp. 841 (D. S.C. 1970); Roberts v. Peppersack, 256 F.
Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967); Blyth v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.
Tex. 1961).
38. Eighth Amendment Challenges, supra note 29, at 293. See also Note, A Review of Pris-
oner's Rights Litigation Under 42 USC. § 1983, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 803, 872 (1977).
39. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afi'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). The Holt court
stated that individual conditions "exist in combination; each affects the other; and taken together
they [may] have a cumulative impact on the inmates." Id. at 373. The court found that the prison
in question was run by inmate trusty guards who bred hatred; open barracks invited frequent
physical and sexual assaults; the isolation cells were overcrowded and unsanitary; and there was
no rehabilitation or training programs available to inmates. The court held that these conditions,
as a whole, violated the eighth amendment. Id.
40. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322-23 (D. N.H. 1977). Accord, Williams v.
Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); Finney v. Hutto, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Gates v.
Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'dsub.
nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), reversed in part and remanded sub nom.,
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afl'd 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), Contra, Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1982).
41. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (mandating that prison condi-
tions alone or in combination may constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Hutto v. Finey, 437
U.S. 678, 687 (1978) ("We find no error in the court's conclusion that, taken as a whole conditions
in the isolation cells continued to violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.")
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In simpler terms, there are two steps in utilizing the totality of con-
ditions approach. As noted, aggregating conditions of confinement is
the first step,42 and an application of realistic yet humane standards to
the conditions as observed 43 is the second. In short, the court must
determine whether aggregated conditions constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.44
In determining whether aggregated conditions constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, the United States Supreme Court has character-
ized the eighth amendment's basic concept of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment as "nothing less than the dignity of man. '45 Therefore, the
scope of the amendment is not static, nor is it easily or precisely de-
fined. 46 It "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 47 However, the
Court has held that eighth amendment judgments should not be merely
the "subjective views" of judges.4 8 Emphasis should be placed on ob-
jective factors to the maximum extent possible.49
In defining the scope of the eighth amendment, contemporary
analysis50 examines whether punishment is disproportionate to the se-
verity of the crime, 5' shocks the court's conscience,5 2 or involves the
(emphasis added); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438
(1983); Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1981); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868
(7th Cir. 1981); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973),
afl'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd 501
F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972).
42. Eighth Amendment Challenges, supra note 29, at 294.
43. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring).
44. Eighth Amendment Challenges, supra note 29, at 294.
45. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
46. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
47. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
48. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
275 (1980)).
49. Id.
50. Historically, the Supreme Court first applied the eighth amendment by comparing chal-
lenged methods of execution to concededly inhuman techniques of punishment because the pri-
mary concern of the drafters was to proscribe tortures and other barbarous methods of
punishment. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted- The Original Meaning, 57
CALIF. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969). Accord, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). See also
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) ("[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture...
and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment.") In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a linger-
ing death.").
51. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
52. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), the Court stated that the standard to be applied is that the punishment must not be "exces-
sive." Two factors are important in determining whether the punishment is excessive. One, the
punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain; and two, the punish-
ment must not be grossly out of proportion with the severity of the crime. Id. at 173.
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unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.53 Although each of the
above tests provides useful guidelines, ultimately, the court attempting
to apply them is left to rely on its own experience and knowledge of
contemporary standards. 54 In determining when prison conditions pass
beyond legitimate punishment and become cruel and unusual, the
"touchstone is on the effect on the imprisoned." 55 The court must ex-
amine the condition of the physical plant, sanitation, safety, inmate
needs and services, and staffing. 56 At the point where the "cumulative
impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens the physical,
mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or
creates a probability of recidivism and future incarceration," 57 courts
will conclude that the conditions violate the Constitution.
B. Overcrowding
Eighth amendment violations are often found in prisons with se-
vere overcrowding. Historically, courts have grappled with the
problems and conditions of overcrowding in two ways. 58  Overcrowd-
ing has been found to be per se unconstitutional59 and conditions as
exacerbated by overpopulation have been found to be unconstitu-
tional.60 The latter theory focuses on the effects of overcrowding and
whether problems caused by overcrowding, such as increased violence
and sexual assaults, render prison conditions unconstitutional. Neither
theory, however, is mutually exclusive because overcrowding in prisons
53. Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of pain are those that are "totally without
penological justification." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 103 (1976). Accord, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring).
54. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 364 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring).
55. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 364 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring) (quoting Laaman
v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D. N.H. 1977)).
56. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 , 364 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring).
57. Id. (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D. N.H. 1977)).
58. It is often difficult to determine which category a case falls into because it is rare that
severe overcrowding does not produce conditions that are held to be unconstitutional in their
cumulative effect. Most cases that have found overcrowding to be per se unconstitutional have
also found that the effects of overcrowding are also unconstitutional. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson,
564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977) and note 59 infra.
59. See Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977); Fimnney v. Arkansas Board of
Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1974),
a'd, 525 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1976).
60. See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388
(10th Cir. 1977); Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.
1975); Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Cambell v. Mc-
Gruder, 416 F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C. 1975), modified, 580 F.2d 521 (1975); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.
Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), af'd sub nor., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977),
rev'd in part and remanded sub noma., Alabama v Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
CHICAGO KENT LAW RE VIEW
often produces a host of collateral problems that when considered in
their "totality" are violative of the Constitution.
Courts have found conditions of overcrowding to be per se uncon-
stitutional because the purpose of the prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment is to protect and safeguard a prison inmate from an
environment where degeneration is probable and self-improvement un-
likely due to conditions which inflict needless mental or physical suffer-
ing. 61 Such confinement, courts hold, "shock(s) the general
conscience" 62 and "offends standards of human decency. ' 63 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit 64 has held that housing two men in a small 35-40 square
foot "cubbyhole" offends the contemporary standard of decency and
has ordered the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to provide each
inmate with a minimum of 60 square feet.65 Similarly, in Hutto v. Fin-
ney6 6 the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding that the
conditions of "punitive isolation" in the Arkansas prisons were cruel
and unusual where an average of four, and sometimes as many as ten
or eleven, prisoners were crowded into windowless 8 by 10 foot cells
containing no furniture other than a source of water and a toilet that
could be flushed only from the outside.67 In another case, 68 a prisoner
was held to have stated an eighth amendment claim where he was con-
fined to a cell, measuring 5 by 7 feet, for nearly six months, along with
four other inmates, and received inadequate bedding, light, toilet facili-
ties, showers, access to legal materials, medical and dental care, and
food.69
Eighth amendment violations have also been found where over-
crowding has created a host of collateral problems. Several courts, for
61. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 394-95 (10th Cir. 1977). The Battle court stated that
crowding is per se unconstitutional where prisoners were forced to sleep in garages, barber shops,
libraries, and stairwells; and when they were placed in dormitories without any toilet and shower
facilities. The court continued, however, to state that it could also find that the effects of the
crowding as it related to conditions of confinement with regard to health, safety, and security was
unconstitutional. Here, the crowding had caused the kitchen water and sewer systems to be over-
taxed. The dining facilities were unsanitary, the prisoners were housed in substandard living
quarters that were "firetraps" and violence was prevalent. Id. at 395.
62. Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1980).
63. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
64. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977).
65. Id. at 397.
66. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
67. Id. at 682.
68. Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1981). See also Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115
(5th Cir. 1982) (Severe overcrowding; inmates were forced to sleep on floors, in tents, and some-
times as many as four in one cell measuring 45 square feet constituted cruel and unusual
crowding).
69. Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir.), cert. deniedsub noma. Boles v. Chavis, 454
U.S. 907 (1981).
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example, have held that overcrowding may render a system unconstitu-
tional by creating an environment in which prisoners are constantly
subjected to threats of violence and sexual assault.70
A number of courts have addressed the issue of whether there is a
constitutional right to a minimum number of square feet per prisoner.
For example, in 1976,71 a federal district court, recognizing that over-
crowding was primarily responsible for the many ills of Alabama's pe-
nal system, specified that each prisoner be housed in a separate cell
containing no less than 60 square feet, and that the prison population
may not exceed the design for that prison. On appeal, however, the
Fifth Circuit found no constitutional basis for the requirement that Al-
abama state prisoners be housed in separate cells and stated that design
standards, without more, cannot amount to a per se constitutional limi-
tation on the number of prisoners that may be housed in a given prison
facility.72 Nevertheless, by 1976, numerous other courts had held that
the Constitution required that each inmate be provided with a mini-
mum of between 60 and 80 square feet.73
The United States Supreme Court74 has recently criticized the
70. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1141 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct.
1438 (1983) ("overcrowding, combined with a relative small number of security guards results in a
constant threat to the inmate's personal safety"); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d
194 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973) (Every
prisoner "has a right, secured by the eighth and fourteenth amendments, to be reasonably pro-
tected from constant threat of violence and sexual assault by his fellow inmates").
71. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 332 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
72. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977). The court also remanded for
further consideration of the district court's requirement that all new prison construction should
provide 60 square feet of space per prisoner. Id.
73. Prison Reform, supra note 6, at 112 & 112 n.82. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d
388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977) (adopting American Public Health Association standard of 60 square feet
per cell and 75 square feet for a person in a dormitory); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Deten-
tion for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 396 (2d Cir. 1975) (50 square feet); Ambrose v. Malcolm,
414 F. Supp. 485, 492-93, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (adopting American Correctional Ass'n standard of
75 square feet per inmate). But see Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438 (1983) (vacating a district court decision that required each inmate con-
fined in a dormitory to be provided with 60 square feet of space); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d
1206, 1215 (5th Cir. 1977) (remanding a district court decision requiring 80 square feet per
inmate).
74. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n.27 (1979) (pretrial detainee case). Bell held that
double-celling did not deprive pretrial detainees of their constitutional rights. It distinguished
other lower court decisions concerning minimum space requirements by stating that the other
cases involved traditional jails and cells in which inmates were locked during most of the day. In
Bell, the pre-trial detainees were required to spend only seven or eight hours each day in their cells
for generally a maximum period of sixty days. Even, assuming arguendo, that this is a valid
distinction, the Court further stated that given this factual disparity, it did not need to decide
whether it agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of cases requiring a minimum space for each
prisoner. Although the recommendations of various groups are instructive, the Court stated,they
simply do not establish the constitutional minima. Rather, they establish goals recommended by
the organization in question. See also Hutto v.Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1977), wherein the
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practice of establishing a constitutional right to a minimum number of
square feet per prisoner. 75 However, the Court has recognized that at
some point overcrowding does state an eighth amendment violation. 76
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court in Rhodes v.
Chapman77 addressed the issue of overcrowding when double-ceiling,
the institutional practice of housing two prisoners in a single cell, was
made necessary by an unanticipated increase in prison population.78
The Court held that the confinement of two persons in one cell is not
per se cruel and unusual when, all prison conditions having been con-
sidered "alone or in combination," inmates are not deprived of the
"minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. ' 79 The Court went on
to explain that the totality of conditions does not offend the Constitu-
tion unless prison conditions are cruel and unusual, and not merely
Court stated that the length of confinement is a vital consideration in deciding whether the cir-
cumstances of the confinement meet constitutional standards. Conditions of what might be tolera-
ble for a short period of time may become intolerable and cruel if extended over long periods of
time.
75. In Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Ark. 1976), the district court stated:
The question of whether a prison is overcrowded to the point of unconstitutionality in-
volves more than determining how many square feet of living space are allocated to
individual inmates. Regard must be had to the quality of the living quarters and to
length of times which inmates must spend in their living quarters each day, further some
small housing units although cramped may be more comfortable and liveable than more
spacious quarters.
See also Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438 (1983)
(vacating a district court decision that required each inmate confined in a dormitory to be pro-
vided with 60 square feet of space); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982) (It is
error to rely exclusively on per capita square footage recommendations).
76. For example, in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) the Court affirmed a finding by the
district court that conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. In Finney confinement in pu-
nitive isolation was for an indefinite amount of time. An average of four prisoners were crowded
into windowless 8 x 10 foot cells containing no furniture other than a source of water and a toilet
that could only be flushed from the outside of the cell. At night prisoners were given mattresses to
spread on the floor. Although some prisoners suffered from infectious diseases such as hepatitis
and venereal disease, mattresses were removed and comingled together each morning, then re-
turned to the cells at random in the evening. Id. at 682. Prisoners in isolation received fewer than
one thousand calories a day. Their meals consisted primarily of four-inch squares of "grue", a
substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a
paste and baking the mixture in a pan. Id. at 683.
77. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
78. At the time of trial, the prison in Rhodes housed 38% more inmates than its "design
capacity," approximately fourteen hundred prisoners of the twenty-three hundred housed were
double-celled in cells sixty-three square feet. Approximately seventy-five percent of the double-
celled prisoners had the choice of spending much of their working hours outside their cells, in the
day rooms, school, workshop, library, visiting rooms, meals and showers. Id. at 341.
79. Id. at 348. (Generalities about overcrowding fall short in themselves of proving cruel and
unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double ceiling inflicts unnecessary or wanton
pain or is grossly disproportionate to the crimes warranting imprisonment). Accord Ruiz v. Es-
telle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438 (1983); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d
420 (4th Cir. 1981).
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harsh or restrictive.80
SMITH v FAIZRMAN
The District Court Finds a Violation of the Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff, Johnny Smith, brought a class action on behalf of himself
and other similarly situated inmates incarcerated at Pontiac.8' The es-
sence of Smith's claim was that he had been deprived of his rights
under the eighth amendment to the Constitution as it applies to the
States through the fourteenth amendment by being subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment arising out of the overcrowded conditions or
"double-ceiling" 82 practices at Pontiac.8 3
Pontiac is a maximum security state penitentiary located in Pon-
tiac, Illinois. It houses inmates who have been convicted of felonies
involving violence and threat to human life. All inmates are commit-
ted for extended periods of time.84 The prison was constructed to ac-
comodate twelve hundred prisoners. At the time of the district court's
decision, the total population of the prison was nineteen hundred and
eighteen prisoners. Approximately fifty-six percent of the inmates were
double-celled, with the remaining prisoners being in segregation or
protective custody.8 5
80. In Rhodes v. Chapman, the district court found that the prison food was adequate, the air
ventilation system was adequate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the tempera-
ture in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the noise in the cell blocks was not excessive.
Double-celling had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the day rooms or visita-
tion facilities, nor had it rendered inadequate the resources of the library or school rooms. Fur-
ther, inmates' medical and dental needs were met and violence had only increased in proportion
to the increase in prison population. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
81. This case began as eight separate actions by indigent Pontiac inmates for equitable and
declaratory relief and for money damages. The cases were consolidated for ease of handling and
judicial economy. A preliminary injunction was issued by the court on August 14, 1980, in-
structing defendants to place the eight individual plaintiffs in single occupancy cells in the general
prison population. Thereafter, on October 30, 1980, the court allowed the plaintiffs motion to
proceed as a class identified as "[all present and future inmates of the Pontiac Correctional
Center who are, have been, or will be punished for refusing to accept a double cell." Smith v.
Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 187 (D.C. Ill. 1981), rev'd, 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982).
82. "Double-celling" refers to the institutional practice of housing two prisoners in a single
cell.
83. Smith also claimed that the defendants, by ordering his confinement in a double occu-
pancy cell, had deliberately refused him medical treatment thereby subjecting him to cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. The trial court concluded that Smith had failed to carry his burden of
proof that he had been deliberately refused necessary medical treatment. Id. at 201.
84. Id. at 187.
85. One thousand six hundred twenty-two inmates were inside the walls of the maximum
security unit and two hundred ninety-six were single celled in the medium security unit outside
the prison walls. Of the one thousand six hundred twenty-two inmates inside the walls of the
maximum security unit, six hundred thirty-nine of the inmates were single-celled for segregation
or protective custody reasons, leaving nine hundred eighty-three inmates to be housed in five
hundred eighty-one cells. Id. at 188.
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Pontiac has three cellblocks. They are the north, south, and west
cellblocks. Each cell in the west cellblock is approximately 64.5 square
feet. Prisoners shower a minimum of three times a week, each cell con-
tains a sink, a sanitary stool, two fixed beds, and a chest of drawers. In
addition, prisoners are permitted to possess twenty-five books, twelve
records, and electronic equipment such as a television set. The equip-
ment in a cell generally leaves 9 square feet for standing room. The
cells in the south and north cellhouses are similar except they are
slightly smaller, measuring approximately 55.3 and 55.5 square feet,
respectively.86 Hot water is available intermittently, lighting is pro-
vided by a single fluorescent bulb, and vents are often covered to cut off
the spread of dust and roaches. 87 The district court concluded that the
conditions of confinement at Pontiac whereby inmates were confined in
double occupancy cells constituted cruel and unusual punishment and
violated the eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. 88
The district court began its analysis by examining the testimony of
five inmates concerning their daily routines at Pontiac.89 From their
testimony it appears that sharing a cell with another inmate is difficult
due to differences in moral standards, religious beliefs, opposing gang
affiliations, lack of privacy and the danger of being sexually attacked.90
Next, the district court recounted the testimony of four persons who
were experienced in the management of correctional institutions. 91 The
86. Id. at 188-89.
87. Id. at 189.
88. Id. at 201.
89. Inmates John Joseph Generella (robbery, attempted burglary, theft), Yusuaf Asad
Madyun (murder), Hassan Abid Muhamad (armed robbery, rape, aggravated kidnapping), Fran-
cisco Negron (armed robbery), and Johnny Smith (murder), testified, emphasizing how double-
ceiling has been particularly troubling for each of them. Generella, for example, testified that he
has had a succession of cellmates who caused him trouble. One cellmate had been a member of
the Klu Klux Klan. Generella had been fearful of attack by other inmates who thought that he
too was a member of the Klan. Another cellmate belonged to a Black gang and used his connec-
tions in an attempt to extort personal property from Generella. Generella reported that he had a
similar experience with a cellmate who belonged to a Hispanic gang.
Generella testified that he lives in constant fear that a cellmate will "go off" and attack him.
He also testified that his personal belongings become common property with a cellmate. There is
also a continual fear of homosexual attack. Id. at 190. For the testimony of inmates Madyun,
Negron, Muhamad, and Smith, see Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 190-93 (C.D. I11. 1981).
90. Id. at 190-93.
91. Although the court stated that the parties introduced five expert witnesses, it only dis-
cussed the testimony of four. Testimony discussed was that of C. Paul Phelps, Secretary of Cor-
rections of the State of Louisiana (witness for defendant); John N. Brown, Warden of Adult
Correctional Institutions in Rhode Island (witness for defendant); Joseph C. Cannon, associate
professor of administration of justice at the University of Missouri (witness for plaintiff); and
David Fogel, professor of criminal justice at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus
(witness for plaintiff). The court heard additional testimony from Linda Adams, in charge of the
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court discredited defendants' expert witnesses, who were unsympa-
thetic to the living conditions of Pontiac prisoners, 92 stating that due to
their occupations with state prison administration, they were biased.93
Plaintiff's expert witnesses, on the other hand, were given great weight.
Both plaintiff's witnesses testified that the cells at Pontiac were too
small for two people. Double-celling at Pontiac, they agreed, deni-
grates the inmates and destroys their potential for correction and in
consequence damages society even further.94 However, other court ap-
pointed expert witnesses disagreed with plaintiff's witnesses as to the
effects of overcrowding. 95
Next, the court distinguished two recent United States Supreme
Court cases 96 where the Court did not find overcrowding rising to the
level of cruel and unusual punishment. The court distinguished these
cases based upon the differing facts in Smith. In contrast to the
Supreme Court cases, prisoners at Pontiac were in smaller cells, serving
research and evaluations in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and Laurel Rands, Deputy
Director for Policy Development of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Id. at 194-97.
92. Mr. Phelps and Mr. Brown both testified that Pontiac was administered well, the prison
was clean,and they did not notice any undue tension among the prisoners. Id. at 194.
Mr. Phelps also testified that he did not believe institutions should be single-celled. He did,
however, testify that when inmates are double-celled there should be enough space in the cell for
both inmates to move about without the necessity of one inmate being on a bunk. The district
court found, from the testimony of other witnesses and its own observation of the cells at Pontiac,
that Pontiac did not even measure up to that minimum standard. Id.
93. Id. The trial judge gave no further reason for having formed the opinion that defend-
ant's expert witnesses were sympathetic with their fellow prison administrators because of their
occupations within the prison system.
94. Id. at 195-97. Overcrowding, Dr. Fogell testified, promotes stealing, tension, fights and
animosities among the inmates and these in turn lead to loss of "good time" and longer stays in
prison and substantially lessen the likelihood of any corrective effect in incarceration. In addition,
emotional problems accompany double-celling because of the absence of privacy. Id. at 196.
Dr. Fogel visited Pontiac and testified that there were odors in the halls arising from the cell
toilets shared by two people and the problems of personal hygiene that accompany such close
proximity. Showers were available infrequently, the noise level was very high, and the security of
an inmates property was very low. Id.
95. For example, Dr. Steven Christianson, a court appointed expert witness, found that frus-
tration, tension, and violent activities had increased in the institution since double-celling had
been instituted. He based his opinion on his interviews with inmates and also on the report of the
Illinois Correctional System which described the conditions at Pontiac in 1977. He also reported a
general consensus of professional thought that overcrowding in a prison leads to increased death
and illness rates, increased psychiatric and committment rates, and increased institutional vio-
lence. Id. at 197-98.
Terry Brelje, a medical psychologist, and Dr. Cavanaugh, a psychiatrist, on the other hand,
were of the opinion that the literature on crowding did not have scientific validity. Further, after
Dr. Cavanaugh examined Smith, he concluded that Smith did not need a single cell for medical or
psychiatric reasons. Id. at 198.
Further, Dr. Gerald Foley, the medical director at Pontiac, volunteered to the court during an
earlier hearing that the celling conditions at Pontiac were cruel and unusual. Id. at 199.
96. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S 520 (1979) (pre-trial
detainee).
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longer sentences, their confinement in the double-cells were for longer
periods of time, air ventilation was inferior, and double-ceiling at Pon-
tiac had rendered inadequate the resources of the library. 97
Further, the district court noted that an indication of the public's
attitude or standard as to what is cruel and unusual can be found in the
enactments of state legislatures. 98 The court observed that Illinois rec-
ognizes that the ceiling conditions at Pontiac are contrary to current
standards of decency99 because Illinois provides that new or remodeled
prisons shall have cells with 50 square feet per inmate. 00
The court concluded that Pontiac is overcrowded, antiquated, and
has inadequate facilities to provide significant and constructive correc-
tional programs to the inmates. The confinement for years of two in-
mates for periods of eighteen to twenty hours a day in a "cramped, ill
ventilated, noisy, space designed a century ago for one person" is a
cruel and unusual punishment and violates the eighth amendment.' 0 '
The district court ordered the elimination of double occupancy cells at
Pontiac. 102
97. More specifically, the district court distinguished Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),
wherein the Supreme Court held that double-bunking ofpre-trial detainees did not deny them
liberty without due process of law, on the ground that Bell did not involve punishment of con-
victed prisoners. Moreover, in Bell, each cell was approximately 75 square feet whereas the cells
in Smith were 55 square feet. Further, in Bell, inmates were free during most of the day to move
freely between their rooms and the common areas. In Smith, confinement was for eighteen to
twenty hours a day. In Bell, the confinement of detainees was generally for a maximum period of
sixty days. In Smith, the confinement was for years. Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 199
(D.C. Ill. 1981).
The district court distinguished Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), wherein the court
held that double-celling was not violative of inmates eighth amendment rights, in that the prison
described in Rhodes was almost the antithesis of the conditions at Pontiac. In Rhodes, the prison
was a "top-flight, first class facility." Id. at 200 (quoting Chapman v Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007,
1009 (S.D. Ohio 1977)). A large number of the cells had a window that the inmates could open
and close. Day rooms were open to inmates between 6:30 a.m. and 9:30 p.m., and inmates were
free to pass between cells and dayrooms during a ten minute period in each hour. The air ventila-
tion was adequate and the cells were substantially free of offensive odors. The temperature in the
cells was well controlled, the noise was not excessive, and double-ceiling in Rhodes did not render
inadequate the resources of the library. Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 199-200 (D.C. Ill.
1981).
98. Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 200 (D.C. Ill. 1981), rev'd, 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir.
1982) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)) (when making eighth amendment judg-
ments, courts should look at objective factors such as "legislative attitudes").
99. Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 200-201 (D.C. Ill. 1981).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-7-3(b) (1977) provides that "All new, remodeled and
newly designated institutions or facilities shall provide at least fifty square feet of cell room or
dormitory space per each person."
101. Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 201 (D.C. Ill. 1981). The court also stated that the
increase in prison population, inadequacy of existing facilities, and the expense of providing addi-
tional facilities are constitutionally inadequate to justify the maintenance of the overcrowding at
Pontiac. Id. (citing Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1978)).
102. Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 201 (D.C.Ill. 1981).
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SMITH v FAIRMAN
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION: REVERSAL OF THE
DISTRICT COURT
Defendants-appellants, various officers of the Illinois Department
of Corrections (IDOC), appealed the trial court's holding, contending
that prison conditions at Pontiac did not rise to the level of cruel and
unusual punishment. The appellate court agreed with defendants, re-
versed the trial court's opinion, and concluded that conditions at Pon-
tiac, "taken as a whole", do not violate the eighth amendment. 0 3
The appellate court's decision was divided into two parts. In the
first part of its opinion, the court recounted the district court's findings
of fact and conclusions. Inmates at Pontiac were crowded, uncomforta-
ble, and spent long hours in their cells.1°4 The appellate court, how-
ever, noted that although numerous experts and prisoners testified that
crowding had caused tension among the prisoners, the topic of institu-
tional safety was barely discussed in the lower court's opinion, except
for a few references to prisoners' remarks that they felt unsafe or were
afraid of homosexual assaults. In contrast, Pontiac Warden, James W.
Fairman, had "demonstrated"'' 0 5 that the total number of incidents of
physical violence, force, or assault had been reduced by nearly fifty
percent since his administration took office in 1978. Warden Fairman
also testified that no inmate had killed another inmate during his two
year tenure, nor had any guards been killed or seriously injured. 10 6
Further, the district court failed to note that Pontiac inmates re-
ceived satisfactory medical and dental attention. 0 7 Finally, their food
was nutritious, the kitchen and dining facilities were clean, and the
food was at least palatable, if not good, according to one expert.' 08
The second part of the appellate court's opinion'0 9 was devoted to
a discussion of recent case law, with a particularly strong emphasis on
Rhodes v. Chapman.110 Whereas the trial court had distinguished
Rhodes on the basis of the dissimilarity between the prison conditions
103. Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982).
104. Id. at 123-24.
105. Warden Fairman apparently brought to court figures indicating the total number of inci-
dents of physical violence, force, or assault at Pontiac since 1978. His figures were unchallenged
on cross-examination. Id. at 124.
106. Id.
107. Id. A licensed physician is staffed at Pontiac seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day.
Pontiac employed a full time dentist, dental assistants, a full time x-ray technician, and a full time
pharmacist to meet the inmates' health needs. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 125-26.
110. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
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in Rhodes and the prison conditions in Pontiac, 1 1 the appellate court
focused on the principles derived from Rhodes. The appellate court
noted that the Rhodes Court refused to hold that double celing by it-
self inflicts pain that amounts to a violation of the Constitution." 2 For
a constitutional violation, the Rhodes Court stated, prison conditions
must involve the "wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain" or be
"grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting im-
prisonment."" 3 The Court emphasized that the eighth amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is a fluid concept
that "must draw its meaning from evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."" 14 Further, judgments must
be formed on the basis of "objective factors" to the maximum extent
possible. 15
The appellate court expressed its view that Rhodes mandated a
"totality of the conditions of confinement" approach to cruel and unu-
sual punishment issues. 16 Therefore, the court's role was to decide
whether the prisoner's proof, "considered as a whole," was sufficient to
trigger an eighth amendment violation." 17
Reviewing the prison conditions at Pontiac, the court restated that
Pontiac inmates receive adequate food and medical care and the sani-
tary conditions at the prison were reasonable. Therefore, prisoners
were not subjected to wanton and unnecessary inflictions of pain." 18
The crux of the appellate court opinion, however, was its observa-
tion that the facts of Smith v. Fairman failed to support the experts' dire
projections as to the effects of double ceiling. The "stark reality," the
court stated, was that physical violence in the institution had declined
markedly in the last few years.' 19 Undoubtedly, the evidence revealed
that life in a two-man cell at Pontiac was unpleasant, but "to the extent
1I1. See supra text accompanying note 95.
112. 690 F.2d at 125 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-49 (1981)).
113. Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
114. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
115. Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
116. Id. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-50 (1981). Accord Ruiz v. Estelle, 679
F.2d 1115, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438 (1983); Madyun v. Thompson, 657
F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1981); Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 1981).
117. 690 F.2d at 125.
118. Id. The court also noted that the crowding problem was at least partly due to the large
amount of personal belongings and food that officials allow prisoners to keep in their cells. The
appellate court sta-ted that this practice is solely within the discretion of the prison administrators
who are best equipped to know what is good for prisoners. Id.
119. Id. Moreover, the court noted, experts opinions as to what constitutes contemporary
standards of decency are merely helpful, not binding. Id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 348 n.13 (1981)).
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that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders [must] pay for their offenses against
society." 120
ANALYSIS OF SMITH V. FAIRMAN
The appellate court properly gave strong emphasis to the recent
Supreme Court case of Rhodes v. Chapman.12' The Rhodes Court held
that double-ceiling, by itself, does not inflict pain that amounts to a
violation of the eighth amendment. For a constitutional violation,
prison conditions, viewed in their totality,1 22 must involve "wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain" or be "grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime warranting imprisonment."' 123
In viewing the conditions at Pontiac as a whole, the Smith court
was also correct in trying to form its opinion on the basis of "objective
factors" to the maximum extent possible.' 24 As did the Rhodes Court,
the Smith court placed a premium on objective statistics.12 5 Of particu-
lar importance was the "effect" that double-celling had on Pontiac in-
mates, 26 because the court's decision turned largely on the concrete
showing made by Warden Fairman that prison violence had decreased
by nearly fifty percent since he took office in 1978.127 Although the
court conceded that experts' opinions as to what constitutes contempo-
120. Id. at 126 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
121. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
122. 1d. at 347 (conditions "alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities").
123. 1d. at 347.
124. 690 F.2d at 125.
125. In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) plaintiffs-inmates failed to produce evidence
establishing that double-ceiling itself caused greater violence. The court found that the number of
acts of violence had increased with the prison population, but only in proportion to the increase in
population. Justice Powell stated:
T. IThe dissent emphasizes the testimony of experts as to psychological problems that
"may be expected" from double ceiling; it also relies on similar testimony as to an in-
crease in tension and aggression. . . . The dissent fails to mention, however, that the
District Court also referred to the testimony by the prison superintendent and physician
that "there has been no increase (in violence] other than what one would expect from
increased numbers [of inmates]." ... More telling is the fact-ignored by the dissent-
that the District Court resolved this conflict in the testimony by holding "that there had
been no increase in violence or criminal activity increase due to double ceiling; there has
been [an increase] due to increased population." . . . This holding was based on uncon-
troverted prison records, required to be maintained by the Ohio Department of Correc-
tions and described by the District Court as being "detail[ed] and bespeak[ing]
credibility." .
Id. at 349-51 n.15.
126. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D. N.H. 1977) (The touchstone of the
eighth amendment inquiry is "the effect upon the imprisoned"). Accord Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 366 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
127. Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d at 124.
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rary standards of decency are merely helpful, and not binding, 128 the
unchallenged "stark reality" was that prison violence was on the de-
cline. 129 Thus, although the inmates at Pontiac produced numerous
experts and prisoners who testified in the abstract that the "effects" of
crowding were to increase tension, violent activities, and fear in prison-
ers of violence and homosexual assaults, 30 the appellate court gave
overriding weight to Warden Fairman's objective "uncontroverted"
demonstration. 31
As previously stated, the appellate court properly emphasized the
role of objective statistical data. The critical question, however, is
whether Warden Fairman's demonstration really was objective and
"uncontroverted." The Warden's data was no doubt self-serving, not
only for purposes of this particular suit, but because of the Warden's
original purpose in collecting the data-to study the overall effective-
ness of his leadership since 1978.132 Further, it is possible that much
violence and homosexual assaults were not reported to prison officials
and thus escaped recordation and compilation. Therefore, abstract
data or testimony by experts, who had observed and talked to inmates
as to an increase in violent activity at Pontiac, may have been statisti-
cally more relevant than the Warden's own data.
It is also important to note that there is a lack of facts, data, and
documentation as to the effects of confinement in cells measuring dif-
ferent dimensions. 33 As a consequence, the appellate court may have
128. Id. at 125 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 n.13 (1981)).
129. Id.
130. The expert witnesses in Smith testified as to their opinions without the use of data or
documentation. For example, plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Fogel, testified that he was of the
"opinion" that emotional problems accompany double-ceiling because of the absence of privacy.
Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 196 (D.C. Ill. 1981). Further, Dr. Christianson, a court
appointed witness, found that frustration, tension, and violent activities had increased at Pontiac
since double-ceiling was instituted. He based his opinion, however, on interviews with inmates
(undocumented) and on the report of the Illinois Correctional System which described the condi-
tions at Pontiac in 1977. Id. at 197.
131. 690 F.2d at 124. See supra text accompanying note 103.
132. Id.
133. See Toch, The Role of the Expert on Prison Conditions.- The Battle of Footnotes in Rhodes
v. Chapman, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 38 [hereinafter cited as Toch] (There is a lack of serious, firsthand
studies of the impact of prison conditions that are at issue in eighth amendment cases).
One study, which examined the effects of prison crowding on inmate health and behavior,
collected data from 1400 inmates serving prison terms in six different federal prisons. All inmates
studied, however, were confined to their living quarters only during sleeping hours. Inmates were
tested for: 1) blood pressure; 2) affective state; 3) crowding tolerance; 4) evaluation of their living
quarters; 5) perceived control of their environment; and 6) biographical data. Data was also col-
lected from institution records on inmate demographic characteristics, illness complaints, and dis-
ciplinary records. Inmates were analysed from two perspectives; spacial density (square feet per
person) and social density (number of occupants per living unit).
The basic finding was that there is a progressive and measurable increase in negative effects
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given more credence to Warden Fairman's demonstration than was
warranted, simply because it was available.
Further, in utilizing the totality of the conditions approach, em-
phasis was necessarily placed by the appellate court, as well as the dis-
trict court, on findings of facts and circumstances as to the conditions at
Pontiac. In reviewing, however, the totality of the conditions at Pon-
tiac the appellate court, at times, stretched to find explanations for the
findings of experts who had visited Pontiac. In this stretching process,
the appellate court also relied on facts that were contradictory.
For example, although the appellate court acknowledged that tes-
timony by inmates and a court appointed expert revealed that Pontiac
was "cramped, dimly lit, poorly ventilated, and occasionally without
hot tap water,"' 34 it noted that the poor ventilation "might" have been
explained by the fact that the ventilation system "could" have been
shut off. 135 To bolster its notion that the ventilation system was ade-
quate, the court further stated that there was evidence that cell airflow
with an increase in housing density. Although a decrease in square feet per individual was an
important factor, it was the increase in social density that was most significant. Findings indicated
that once space per person exceeded 50 square feet, the number of people that one is living with
and how that space is arranged (single-ceiling, cubicles, etc.) may be more important factors in
determining reactions to housing than mere space per person. Further confirmation of the impor-
tance of social density was the finding that providing 50 square feet in single cells or cubicles was
superior to more spacious multiple occupant housing. The picture, however, was less clear regard-
ing adequate space parameters for single occupant housing. There were no measurable differ-
ences between 50 and 60 square feet.
The findings also supported the following principal conclusions:
1) High degrees of sustained crowding have a wide variety of negative psychological and
physiological effects including increased illness complaint rates, higher death and suicide rates,
and higher disciplinary rates.
2) Large institutions produce much more severe psychological and physiological effects
than small institutions, as expressed in higher death, suicide, and psychiatric commitment rates.
3) There are substantial individual differences in responses to crowding as well as racial and
ethnic group differences.
The study suggested that a design for an ideal prison, soley from the perspective of reducing
crowding effects, and independent of other prison management considerations, would be a rela-
tively small prison (less than 1000 and preferably 500) that consisted of single rooms or cubicles.
The amount of space required for these inmates was harder to pinpoint. No evidence was found
to indicate that a 50 square foot cell is psychologically inadequate. The researchers, however,
found no single cells smaller than that so they did not know whether 50 square feet represents the
minimally adequate size for a single room. Further, it is possible that space may be a more impor-
tant factor in prisons where inmates are confined for large parts of the day to their housing units.
In all samples in this project, inmates were confined to their housing units only during sleeping
hours. In the one study that was done where inmates were confined for large parts of the day in
their cells, stronger effects of space than of social density was found. Clearly, additional research
needs to be done regarding time and space related crowding effects. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Na-
tional Institute of Justice, The Effect of Prison Crowding on Inmate Beha vior, (Dec. 1980). See also
Bukstel & Kiliman, Psychological Effects of Imprisonment on Confined Individuals, 88 PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL BULLETIN, No. 2, 246-93 (1980).
134. 690 F.2d at 124 (quoting Smith v. Fairman, 528 F. Supp. 186, 189 (D.C. Ill. 1981))
135. Id.
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was deliberately obstructed when prisoners covered their vents to block
the invasion of roaches. 136 However, the court soon contradicted itself
by giving weight to a correctional expert (witness for defendant) who
testified that there was no vermin (small pests) problem at Pontiac. 37
Thus, from the appellate court's recount of the facts and conclusions
developed at the trial level, it is obvious that facts pertaining to the
ventilation system and roach or vermin problem at Pontiac were in dis-
pute. In short, it is not very clear what some of the conditions at Pon-
tiac were like. 138 The appellate court also gave no justification for
giving greater weight to the testimony of the correctional expert than
the testimony of the court appointed expert.
At the heart of the court's opinion is the notion that, absent "tales
of horror" in eighth amendment cases, the totality of conditions ap-
proach will be utilized whereby prisoners will have the burden of com-
ing forward with hard core data on the substantial long term effects of
double-celling. Further, in the absence of such evidence, inmates must
clearly show that conditions of confinement are not within the limits of
today's civilized standards. 39 In light of evidence as to the many satis-
factory conditions of confinement at Pontiac, 40 even if the inmates had
136. Id.
137. Correctional expert, C. Paul Phelps testified that the units in the west and south cell-
houses were unusually clean. He believed that no vermin problems existed based on the manner
in which inmates stored food and their failure to mention such pests. Id. The court appears to
have used the words "roach" and "vermin" interchangeably. Id.
138. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the trial judge heard the testimony of the
witnesses, observed their demeanor, and visited a Pontiac Correctional Center himself. 528 F.
Supp. at 187. These are additional reasons why more deference should have been accorded to the
careful conclusions of the trier of fact.
139. The factors that convince the courts that confinement in a particular institution violates
the eighth amendment vary from case to case, but certain themes emerge. As the court stated in
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977):
The Physical plant must be minimally adequate: lighting, heating, plumbing, ventila-
tion, cell size and recreation space are all examined. The institution, and especially the
food preparation and medical facilities, must be sanitary, and inmates must be provided
with clean places to eat, sleep, work and play and the wherewithal to keep themselves
and their cells clean. Their environment must be minimally safe: dangers are presented
by the presence of the mentally deranged, the violent and the diseased; by the presence
of rats, insects and other vermin; by the absence of fire fighting equipment and adequate
emergency exits and plans. The administration must provide adequate clothing, nutri-
tion, bedding, medical, dental and mental health care, visitation time, exercise and recre-
ation. Each prisoner is entitled to a minimal amount of either private or semiprivate
space. Idleness and obstructions to self-improvement are not tolerable. And, finally,
inmates may not occupy positions of power with authority over other prisoners or fulfill
functions for which they are not qualified. The prison must have, both in quality and
quantity, sufficient staff to maintain minimal control over the institution.
Id. at 323.
140. Pontiac prisoners receive adequate medical attention and nutritious food. 690 F.2d at
124. Each double cell has a sink, a sanitary stool, two beds, a chest of drawers, books, records, and
electronic equipment. Id.
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established that the ventilation system was inadequate and there was a
vermin problem at Pontiac, they would not have been able to show that
conditions at Pontiac, in their totality, were outside the limits of today's
civilized standards.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SMITH DECISION
Smith v. Fairman should not be construed as a retreat from careful
judicial scrutiny of prison conditions.' 4' Federal courts have emerged
as a critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane prison condi-
tions,' 42 even at significant financial costs. 43 Courts considering an
eighth amendment challenge to conditions of confinement now ex-
amine the totality of the circumstances and apply realistic and humane
standards to the conditions observed. 44 The approach is unavoidably
a subjective application of judges' views on concepts of dignity, hu-
manity, and decency. 45
As a practical matter, in utilizing the totality of the conditions ap-
proach, courts are balancing those conditions that are satisfactory (e.g.,
medical attention and nutritious food) against those that are not (e.g.,
overcrowding, inadequate ventilation, vermin) and to the extent that
141. Accord Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring) (empha-
sizing that the decision in Rhodes should not be construed as a retreat from judicial scrutiny of
prison conditions). But see id. at 375-76. (Marshall, J. dissenting) (The majority, in stating that
courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements
of the Constitution, added dicta that may be read as a warning to federal courts against interfer-
ence with a State's operation of its prisons).
142. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1141 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438
(1983) (Overcrowding combined with the relatively small number of security guards, resulting in a
constant threat to inmate's personal safety, a lack of privacy, an increase in tension, and a possible
spread of disease, imposes cruel and unusual punishment on inmates); Battle v. Anderson, 447 F.
Supp. 510, 525 (E.D. Okla.), aff'd, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977) ("Certainly where prisoners are
forced to sleep in garages, barber shops, libraries, and stairwells, and where they are placed in
dormitories without any toilet and shower facilities the crowding has passed the constitutional
threshold."). See also Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1977); Finney v.
Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318,
325 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'din relevant part sub. nom., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1977).
143. Although the courts cannot require the legislature to appropriate monies for prison re-
form, courts hold that if a state chooses to run a prison, it must do so without depriving inmates of
their constitutional rights. Thus, inadequacy of funds is not a legitimate non-compliance defense.
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319-20 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Ruiz v Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115,
1146 (5th Cit. 1982) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438 (1983) (Constitutional rights are not confined to
those available at modest cost); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir.
1974) ("Lack of funds is not an acceptable excuse for unconstitutional conditions of incarcera-
tion") Accord, Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977), affid 616 F.2d 598
(1st Cir. 1980); Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 595 (D.P.R. 1976), aff'd 551 F.2d 877 (1st
Cir. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), ar'd in relevant part sub. nom.,
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
144. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring).
145. Id. at 363-64 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
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the totality of prison conditions are merely harsh and restrictive, "they
are part of the penalty that criminal offenders must pay for their of-
fenses against society."'146
Evidence of "design capacity" and recommended studies are not
controlling.147 They do not establish the constitutional minima, rather
they establish aspirational goals by the organization in question. 148
The touchstone of the eighth amendment inquiry will be the "cumula-
tive impact" of the conditions of incarceration on inmates. 149
Smith v. Fairman illustrates the way in which courts emphasize the
need for evidence pertaining to the "actual effects"' 50 of challenged
conditions on the well-being of the prisoners. In Smith, uncontroverted
data (violence rates) provided by Warden Fairman triumphed over the
extrapolations of expert witnesses who had visited Pontiac. Similarly,
in the recent case of Rhodes v. Chapman,'5' data pertaining to inci-
dence rates triumphed over the abstract expert testimony as to the pos-
sible effects of overcrowding. 52
In determining whether the totality of conditions violates the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,
judges are asking questions of fact and cases will not be decided based
on experts' undocumented opinions on the effects of overcrowding. An
experts' recitation of standards, generalities, and opinions are consid-
ered unresponsive and inadequate.153  Only well-documented,
researched facts will withstand the scrutiny of judicial decision-making
in this area. 154
146. Id. at 347.
147. Id. at 348 n. 13. The footnote applies to design capacity as well as to expert opinion. See
supra note 70, 72 and accompanying text.
148. Cf. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (The fact that the prison in question
housed 38% more inmates than its design capacity by itself falls short of proving cruel and unusual
punishment).
149. Id. at 366. (Brennan, J. concurring) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269,
323 (D. N.H. 1977)).
150. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 367 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring). Although
the court in Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1286 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part,
679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1348 (1983), stated that injury to inmates
from challenged prison conditions does not have to be demonstrated with a high degree of speci-
ficity. and certainty, the court in Smith is demanding, at the very least, well-documented, concrete
data on the effects of overcrowding on inmates.
151. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
152. In Rhodes, prison records, required to be maintained by the Ohio Department of Correc-
tions, revealed that the number of acts of violence had increased only in proportion to the increase
in prison population. Inmates had failed to establish that double-ceiling caused greater violence.
The Court did not find a constitutional violation. Id. at 342-43.
153. Toch, supra note 129 at 49.
154. Id. at 47-48. Toch states that the consequence of this trend will be to (1) upgrade exper-
tise, (2) provide portraits of the impact of overcrowding, and (3) concretize thresholds of inmate
suffering so that everyone can face them. Id.
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The consequence of the trend to emphasize facts, data, and docu-
mentation will be to increase the role of the expert in eighth amend-
ment inquiries.'" 5 Although the Supreme Court has stated that the
generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily in determining
contemporary standards of decency as the public attitude toward a
given sanction, 156 experts in future litigation will play a crucial role in
providing courts with the objective criteria that courts now require to
find a constitutional violation.
The Smith court sends a clear message that future litigants will be
wise to provide courts with documented portraits of the impact of over-
crowding on inmates. Courts, faced with such evidence, may continue
to find that the totality of conditions at many prisons, due to severe
overcrowding, is in fact violative of the eighth amendment. 5 7
CONCLUSION
Courts considering an eighth amendment challenge to conditions
of confinement must examine the totality of conditions of confinement
and apply realistic and humane standards to the conditions observed.
An emphasis will be placed on objective factors to the maximum extent
possible.
Although the Smith court may have placed too much emphasis on
the prison Warden's statistical data, the court properly emphasized the
needs for documented, researched facts pertaining to the actual effects
of overcrowding at Pontiac. In addition, even assuming there is im-
proper ventilation and a roach problem, overall conditions at Pontiac
(a maximum security prison) do not appear to rise to the level of cruel
and unusual punishment. Although conditions at Pontiac may be re-
155. When the horrors of prison conditions are overwhelmingly offensive, expertise seems su-
perfluous. Any layman can tell that conditions under which inmates are imprisoned are unfit for
human habitation. Id. at 40. Absent tales of horror, however, it is exceedingly important that
experts provide the court with documented evidence that prison conditions, as a whole, rise to the
level of unconstitutionality.
156. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 348, n.13; Bell v. Wolfish, 411 U.S. at 543-44; Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173.
157. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 376 (Marshall, J. dissenting). Justice Marshall,
in his dissent, wrote that federal intervention is needed to protect the rights of prisoners. He
stated:
With the rising crime rates of recent years, there has been an alarming tendency toward a
simplistic penological philosophy that if we lock the prison doors and throw away the
keys, our streets will somehow be safe. In the current climate, it is unrealistic to expect
legislators to care whether the prisons are overcrowded or harmful to inmate health. It is
at that point-when conditions are deplorable and the political process offers no re-
dress-that the federal courts are required by the Constitution to play a role.
Id. at 376-77.
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strictive and harsh, they do not appear to be shocking nor are punish-
ments disproportionate to the inmate's precipitating offenses.
Future eighth amendment litigants, subject to severe overcrowding
and double-ceiling, may be able to prevail if they can show data as to
the actual effects of long-term confinement in less than ideal sized cell
arrangements. Smith makes clear that absent tales of horror in prison
institutions, the need for extensive and explicit data is crucial.
